The formal exchange of information between competition authorities in the context of investigations into severe nuclear cartels, 2005 (pdf) Section 3 (1) of the Act provides for a blanket prohibition on the conclusion of agreements that could create or create an AAEC in India: Article 19(1) of the Act provides that the ICC may request any alleged violation of Section 3 (1) of the Act itself or after receiving information from individuals. , consumers, their association or their professional organization, in case of payment of fees and in the prescribed manner. The ICC may also act when the central government or a state government or legal authority refers to it. The ICC only continues the investigation in cases of prima facie and then orders the Director General to open an investigation into the matter. In cases where, as a result of an investigation, the ICC finds that the agreement is anti-competitive and has AAEC, it may take any of the following orders, with the exception of the interim measures it may take under Section 33 of the Act: not necessarily, while competitors should be assured not to disclose competition information to each other in connection with such allegations. , either directly or through intermediaries such as HCPs. A particularly serious type of anti-competitive agreement would be cartels. Agreements on cartels and abuse of dominance generally consist of setting prices, manipulating tendering procedures, dividing markets or limiting production. As a result, cartels have little or no incentive to lower prices or offer better quality goods or services. According to economic studies, cartels overload an average of 30%.
There are four main types of agreements: the best results are achieved by discouraging companies from training. Severe sanctions are therefore a fundamental element of an effective policy on cartels and abuse of dominance against fundamental agreements. Sanctions imposed on individuals for their involvement in the conspiracy are an important complement to the funds paid to organizations for cartel behaviour. These sanctions may take the form of significant administrative sanctions or, in some countries, the criminal sanction of detention. The prospect of detention can be a strong deterrent for businessmen considering a cartel agreement. Vertical agreements exist between companies at different stages of the production chain, such as an agreement between the manufacturer and a distributor.B. The presumed rule does not apply to vertical agreements. Whether the vertical agreement causes AAEC is determined by a basic rule. When a common sense rule is applied, the positive and negative effects of competition are analyzed.
In order to determine whether an agreement is contrary to Article 3(4), which violates Section 3, paragraph 1, of the Act, the following five essential elements of Section 3, paragraph 4, must be respected: given this power of the ICC, it is essential that the parties operating in India be aware of the agreements that can be considered “anti-competitive” in the field of labelling. In this newsletter, we will discuss the situations and conditions under which an agreement may become anti-competitive. Research and development agreements and technology transfer agreements are often compatible with competition law, as some new products require expensive research that would be too costly for a company that works alone. Agreements for joint production, purchase or sale or standardization may also be legal. Is an exchange of anti-competitive information in the pharmaceutical sector more likely, given the greater transparency imposed by measures such as disclosure of relationships with HCPs, clinical trials, etc.? While operating in India, parties are prohibited from entering into anti-competitive agreements. In general, agreements that have or are likely to have significant negative effects on competition (“AAEC”) are anti-competitive agreements.